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Abstract
We investigate the role of limited access to airport facilities as a determinant of the hub
premium in the US airline industry. We use original data from competition plans that airports
are required to submit to the Department of Transportation in compliance with the Aviation
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We nd that the hub premium is increasing in the ticket fare. We nd that control of gates is
a crucial determinant of this premium. Limits on the fees that airlines can charge for subleasing
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the size and the determinants of the hub premium, by which we
mean the di¤erence between the fares charged for trips into and from airports where major airlines
have their hubs, and the fares that are charged for similar trips except that they do not originate
from or end in a hub.
We focus on the role of operatingpractices limiting access to airport facilities that Borenstein
(1989) and the Government Accounting O¢ ce [GAO (1989, 1990)] identied as a set of potential
barriers to entry in the airline industry and that could explain the hub premium, and more generally,
high airline fares.1 Such operating practices are quite simple to describe. Airlines need ticket
counters, baggage check-in rooms, baggage claim areas, and, most importantly, enplaning/deplaning
gates to provide service at an airport. However, access to these airport facilities is typically regulated
by long term exclusive contracts between airlines and airports. Thus, new entrants typically can
only gain access to an airport by paying sublease fees.2 These institutional barriers to entry should
be associated with higher prices, particularly at airports where gates are a scarce resource, such as
airports where the number of departures is very large relative to the number of gates available.
We build a unique and original dataset to measure the importance of operatingpractices as
determinants of the hub premium. The original data are from competition plans that airports are
required to submit to the Department of Transportation in compliance with the Aviation Investment
1See Carlton (2004), Schmalensee (2004), and McAfee, Mialon, and Williams (2004) for a recent debate on the
economics of barriers to entry. The institutional barriers to entry we examine in this paper are the result of explicit
contractual agreements that limit potential competitorsaccess to the necessary airport facilities to o¤er service.
2Borenstein (1989) and studies by the Government Accounting O¢ ce [GAO 1989, 1990] also identied marketing
practices that might explain higher fares. Incumbent airlines use frequent yer programs (FFPs) and volume incentives
to travel agents to build a loyal customer base, making entry by new carriers more di¢ cult. Direct data on these
practices remains unavailable.
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and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21). AIR 21, which was signed into law in April, 2000,
stated that beginning in scal year 2001, no federal grant would be made to fund any one of a set
of "major" airports unless the airport had submitted a written competition plan. The competition
plan must include information on the availability of airport gates and related facilities, leasing and
sub-leasing arrangements, gate-use requirements, gate-assignment policies, and whether the airport
intends to build or acquire gates that would be used as common facilities.3
We estimate a linear specication of the (reduced form) pricing equation. To control for the
signicant number of unobserved factors impacting both consumersdecisions to y and the costs
of o¤ering service on any particular route, we include route-carrier xed e¤ects. This has the
advantage of providing a clear source of identifying variation for the parameters of interest while
still allowing us to recover the impact of time invariant barriers to entry on equilibrium pricing
decisions using the minimum distance procedure of Chamberlain (1982).
We report three main ndings. First, the hub premium is increasing in the ticket fare. The hub
premium is lower than 10 percent at the 10th percentile of the fare distribution and almost as high
as 25 percent at its 90th percentile.
Second, we nd that the hub premium is reduced by almost one half if we include our measures
of barriers to entry in the empirical analysis. We show that the control of gates leased on an
exclusive basis by an airline is a crucial determinant of the hub premium. In particular, if the
percentage of gates controlled by the carrier increases from 10 to 30 percent, the prices increase by
3 percent. Other variables that are associated with high premia are those that record the presence
of restrictions on the fees that airlines can charge for subleasing their gates. Prices are 2 percent
3Section 155.f.(1-2), H.R. 1000.
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lower when limits on sublease fees are in place.
Finally, we construct a new measure of congestion, which is here dened as the ratio of total
quarterly departures out of an airport over the number of gates at an airport. We show that
the interaction of this new variable with the measures of barriers to entry plays a crucial role in
explaining the hub premium. At an airport where there are around 600 departures per gate in a
quarter (e.g. Atlanta), a 30 percent di¤erence in the gates leased would lead to a di¤erence of 6
percent in the airline prices. At an airport where there are around 200 departures per gate (e.g.
Nashville), a 30 percent di¤erence would lead to a di¤erence of 2 percent in prices. Similarly, we
show that at an airport where there are around 600 departures per gate, the presence of a limit
on the sublease fees lowers the premium by approximately 11 percent but only decreases it by 2
percent at airports with 120 departures per gate. Thus, exclusive control of gates explains high
fares only when there is a scarcity of gates relative to the number of departures at an airport. This
suggests that e¤orts to improve access to gates should be concentrated on those major airports
that are most congested (large number of departures relative to the number of boarding gates).
These results are novel and important because they show a direct, clear, relationship between
limited access to airport facilities and hub premia. Previous works could only provide indirect
evidence on the relationship between limited access to airport facilities and hub premia. For
example, Borenstein (1989) proxied limited access to airport facilities with a measure of airlines
airport dominance,the percentage of passengers ying on one airline at an airport. Borenstein
showed that airlinesfares were positively correlated with the airlines share of passengers on the
route and at the endpoint airports.4 Clearly, the main limitation of using indirect evidence is that
4Evans and Kessides [1993] add market and, separately, rm xed e¤ects and conrm Borensteins nding that
airport dominance by a carrier is correlated with higher fares, but do not nd that dominance at the route level is
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the proxy might only capture part of the e¤ect that limited access to gates has on hub premia. We
show that this is actually the case: once we control for route-carrier xed e¤ects, the percentage
of passengers ying on one airline at an airport does not pick any of the e¤ect of limited access to
airport facilities on hub premia.
We provide a description of the new data that we collected from the airportscompetition plans
in Section 2. The fare and passenger data are described in Section 3. Our econometric specication
is discussed in Section 4. We then provide a detailed description of the results in Section 5. Section
6 concludes.
2 Limited Access to Airport Facilities
2.1 The Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century
In response to governmental, public and academic concern with the existence of institutional barriers
to entry in the airline industry, President Clinton signed into law the Wendell H. Ford Aviation
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21) on April 5, 2000. AIR 21 identied
a set of major airports that had to be available on a reasonable basis to all carriers wishing to
serve these airports. The set of airports identied by AIR 21 were commercial service airports that
both had more than 0.25 percent of the total number of passenger boardings each year in the US
and where one or two air carriers controlled more than 50 percent of the passenger boardings.5
As a result of AIR 21, all of these airports have compiled competition plans. We were able to
collect the competition plans and construct a cross-section of data where the unit of observation
statistically or economically signicant. Evans and Kessides conclude that the most promising direction for public
policy aimed at improving the industrys performance is to ensure equal access to sunk airport facilities. This is
exactly what we conrm in this paper.
5These airports consist of large and medium hubs at which one or two airlines board more than 50% of the
passengers. See Section (7.2).
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is the airport. From these plans, we gathered information on the availability of airport gates,
leasing and subleasing arrangements of gates and other airport facilities, as well as airline-airport
agreements.6
There is one potential limitation of the data that we collected. We only have one observation for
each airport, and the observation is for one year between 2001 and 2004. To address this limitation
of the data, we restrict our analysis to the years 2002, 2003 and 2004. For these years, the data on
the limited access to airport facilities is appropriate, given the long-term nature of the contracts
that airlines sign with airports for the use of gates. The 1990 study by the Government Accounting
O¢ ce reported that 22 percent of the gates at the 66 largest airports were for 3 10 years duration;
25 percent were for 11   20 years duration; and 41 percent were for more than 20 years duration
(GAO (1990)).7 It is also worth noting that airlines can not terminate leases unilaterally. For
example, in the case of Dallas Love airport, American Airlines was seeking termination of the gate
lease agreements with the airport. American no longer used the gates but was obligated to continue
paying $335,000 per year.8 The Dallas Love airport declined to terminate the lease agreement and
American will have to pay until 2011, when the lease expires.9
6Washington National, New Yorks La Guardia, and Dallas Love Field (the main hub of Southwest) have perimeter
rules, which limit long-haul ights to and from these airports. For example, non-stop ights from Phoenix to
Washington National and New Yorks La Guardia were prohibited until 2004. Since in this paper we do not distinguish
nonstop from connecting service as di¤erent products, we do not include perimeter rules in the analysis. Washington
National, Chicago OHare, and New Yorks La Guardia and Kennedy have slot controls to reduce congestion by
limiting the number of takeo¤s and landings per hour. However, we only have the competition plans for Washington
Reagan and OHare, and including route-carrier xed e¤ects practically rules out the use of variables measuring the
e¤ects of slot restrictions.
7For example, in the competition plan submitted by the Philadelphia airport (dated 2000), we read that the lease
agreements were signed in 1974 and will expire in 2006. In the competition plan submitted by the Atlanta airport
(dated 2000), we read that exclusive-use leases for gates and other facilities expire on September 20, 2010.
8See the June 30, 2003, Letter from Mr Gwyn, Director of Aviation, City of Dallas, to Ms. Lang, Deputy Director
of Airport Planning and Programming, Federal Aviation Administration.
9See the February 28, 2005, Letter from Mr Gwyn, Director of Aviation, City of Dallas, to Ms. Lang, Deputy
Director of Airport Planning and Programming, Federal Aviation Administration.
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2.2 Access to Gates
Airlines require enplaning/deplaning gates to provide service at an airport. An exclusive-use lease
gives the lessee the sole right to use the facilities in question. The 1990 study by the GAO reported
that nearly 88 percent of the gates at the 66 largest airports were leased to airlines, and 85 percent
of those were leased for exclusive use. Most of the remaining gates were leased on a preferential
basis, giving the lessee the rst right to use the facilities. For example, in Salt Lake City, 96 percent
of the gates were leased on an exclusive use basis, and 3 percent were leased on a preferential use
basis in 1996 (TRB (1999)). Some airports (16 percent) have use-or-lose provisions for exclusive
leases, allowing the airport to gain control of the gate if the lessee does not use the gates. However,
an airline must cease all operations for 1 to 3 months before losing the right to the gates, which is
unlikely to occur (GAO (1990)).
Among the information included in the competition plans, airports reported the total num-
ber of gates available, the number of gates for common use (neither leased on an exclusive or
preferential basis), and the number of gates leased to each airline on an exclusive or preferential
use basis. We construct three variables to code this information. First, we dene the variables
OwnGatesOriginjr and OwnGatesDestjr, which measure the percentage of gates leased on an
exclusive or preferential basis to airline j at, respectively, the origin and destination endpoints
of route r. We construct OwnGatesOriginjr and OwnGatesDestjr for the following airlines:
American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, USAir, and America West. We do not make a
distinction between exclusive and preferential leases because even in this second framework, airlines
can maintain control of the gates as long as they use them. Table 1 shows that on average an
airline controls 13:6 percent of the gates at an airport, but one airline can control up to 79 percent
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of them.Second, we dene the variables NumberGatesOriginjr and NumberGatesDestjr, which
measure the number of total gates at, respectively, the origin and destination endpoints of route r.
2.3 Sublease Fees
When an entrant wants to start service at an airport where most of the gates are leased on an
exclusive or preferential basis, its main option is to sublease the gates and other facilities from
an incumbent. O¢ cials from Southwest Airlines, America West, and other airlines reported that
subleases increased their costs by many times what they would face if they leased the gates directly
from the airports (GAO (1989, 1990)).
To facilitate entry, some airports have introduced a limit to the fees that can be charged by
an airline when subleasing their gates to a competitor. We dene the variables LimitOriginr and
LimitDestr as categorical variables that are equal to one if, respectively, the origin or destination
airport have set a maximum limit on sublease fees. The presence of limits should lower the cost
of serving an airport for new entrants and result in lower prices. The variables MaxLimitOriginr
and MaxLimitDestr measure the e¤ect of the actual limit set on the sublease fees conditional
on LimitOriginr and LimitDestr being equal to one. The higher the maximum limit set by an
airport, the higher should be the prices in markets originating and ending in that airport. Table
1 shows that the average maximum limit is 25 percent.10
2.4 Majority-in-Interest Agreements
Some airports (e.g. Dallas/Fort Worth or DFW) share the rights to decide on expansion projects
with the airline controlling the majority of their operations (e.g. American at DFW). Airports and
10A negative correlation between the presence of a limit and fares assumes that incumbent carriers are willing to
lease gates to competitors. If the maximum limit is set too low, a rm may choose to allow a gate to sit vacant
rather than lease it to an entrant who will introduce an additional source of competition.
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airlines sign Majority-in-Interest (MII) agreements to this purpose. Airports are willing to sign
these agreements because they can get lower interest rates on their debt issues. Airlines are willing
to sign MIIs to ensure that the airport does not unilaterally issue additional debt, which the tenant
airlines would have to pay with higher lease payments, landing fees, or other charges. In some
cases, airlines even have veto power over airport expansions. One way to think of these agreements
is that the carriers put themselves at risk as they bear some of the costs of the airports facilities.
The airport competition plans report whether the airport has a Majority-in-Interest agreement
with airlines that serve the airport. However, typically the competition plans are quite vague in
the exact specics of these agreements. We dene two variables, MiiOriginr and MiiDestr to
measure the e¤ect that these types of agreements have on prices.
3 Airline Data
Our empirical analysis relies on data from three publicly available sources other than the compe-
tition plans. Similar to previous studies of the industry, a signicant amount of our data comes
from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B). The DB1B Survey is a 10 percent sample
of tickets from all reporting carriers and includes information on the origin, destination, fare paid,
as well as details of any connections an individual makes in route to their nal destination.
In addition to the DB1B Survey, we also utilize information from the T100 Segment database
which provides details on each carriers non-stop ights between two particular airports. The data
are reported on a monthly frequency and include information on the carrier, origin, destination,
aircraft type, service class for transported passengers, freight and mail, available capacity (seats),
scheduled departures, departures performed, aircraft hours, and load factor.
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The remainder of the data we use in our analysis is taken from the Schedule P-12 database
which reports quarterly prot and loss statements for carriers with annual operating revenues of $20
million or more. This database includes quarterly operating revenues and expenses, depreciation
and amortization, operating prot, income tax, and net income. We discuss the details of how
each of these data sources is used in the sections to follow.11
3.1 Market Denition
A market is dened as a unidirectional trip between two airports, regardless of the number of stops
that the traveler had to make in between.12 This denition permits us to analyze whether the
hub premium is di¤erent on routes to and from the hub. The dataset includes all markets between
airports identied by AIR 21 as the set of major airportsthat had to be available on a reasonable
basis to all carriers. There are 1; 375 unidirectional routes (airport-to-airport).
3.2 Carrier Denition
There are nine national carriers between 2002 and 2004: American, Continental, Delta, America
West, Northwest, United, USAir and Southwest. Then, there are three low cost carriers with
a strong national presence: Airtran, ATA, and Frontier. Finally, there is a remaining group of
independent low cost carriers providing mostly regional service. We combine this third group of
smaller carriers into one group, which we call the LCC type. This helps us avoid dropping small
carriers that are present in few markets and use a meaningful grouping while capturing the impact
of their presence in the market.
11A more detailed description of the data is given in the Appendix.
12See Peters (2006) for the same denition of market.
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3.3 Itinerary Fare
The DB1B Survey is a 10 percent sample of tickets sold by airlines in a quarter. This dataset does
not provide information on the date when the ticket was sold or used, or on the characteristics of
the buyer. However, the dataset does provide information on characteristics of the trip, such as
whether the ticket is for round-trip travel and details of any connections made by the passenger.
We summarize the airline pricing behavior using the mean, median, the 25th, the 75th, and the
90th percentiles. By doing so, we use some information on the distribution of prices available from
the DB1B dataset while using as few statistics as possible.13
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the ve measures of itinerary fares used in this paper.
The fares are measured in 1993 dollars. The di¤erence between the 75th percentile of the fares
(166:9 dollars) and the median (121:9 dollars) is twice as large as the di¤erence between the median
and the 25th percentile of the fares (97:1 dollars), suggesting that there is much more dispersion at
the top of the distribution than at the bottom. This is conrmed by the average ticket fare, equal
to 140:9 dollars, almost one standard deviation above the median.
3.4 Hub Categorical Variables
The classication of airports as hubs is to some extent arbitrary because it requires a threshold
on the percentage of passengers using the airport who are traveling through, rather than to or
from the airport. There are two problems with using such a threshold. First, the percentage of
passengers traveling through an airport is a function of the price charged by the airlines, which
is the dependent variable. Second, airlines can change their hubs over time. In light of these two
13See Armantier and Richard [Rand, forthcoming] for an interesting way to use information from the distribution
of prices.
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observations, we use a conservative denition of hubs.
Those airports we dene as hubs include: Dallas/Fort Worth, Chicago OHare, St. Louis for
American Airlines; Houston Intercontinental, Newark, and Cleveland for Continental; Atlanta and
Cincinnati for Delta; Phoenix for America West; Minneapolis and Detroit for Northwest; Chicago
OHare and Denver for United; Charlotte and Philadelphia for USAir. All these airports were hubs
over the time period under study.
We dene HubUmbrellaOriginjr to be equal to 1 if the origin airport is a hub of any of the
national carriers. We dene HubUmbrellaDestjr similarly, using the destination airport. Then,
we dene HubCarrierOriginjr to be equal to 1 whenever the observation is for carrier j out of
an airport where carrier j is the hub airline. Thus, HubUmbrellaOriginjr is equal to 1 whenever
HubCarrierOriginr is equal to one, but not vice-versa. We dene HubCarrierDestjr similarly.
These four categorical variables play a critical role in our analysis because their interpretation is
related to the debate on the hub premium in a very simple fashion.
First, these four hub variables will measure whether prices and markups are still higher in hub
markets, after we control for various determinants of prices, most importantly the new measures
of barriers to entry. Second, we identify whether hub airlines charge a premium on tickets for
markets out of their hub airport compared to tickets for markets into the same airport. The
di¤erence for tickets on markets out of the hub and tickets into the hub is the di¤erence between
the sum of the coe¢ cients of the variables HubUmbrellaOriginr and HubCarrierOriginjr and
the sum of the coe¢ cients of the variables HubUmbrellaDestr and HubCarrierDestjr. Finally,
the coe¢ cient estimate of HubUmbrellaOriginr and HubUmbrellaDestr measure the presence of
umbrella e¤ects,or a measure of the benet to carriers with smaller operations in hub markets.
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Should we nd HubUmbrellaOriginr to be positive and signicant, we would conclude that all
carriers can charge a premium in markets out of a hub airport.
The main objective of our paper is to identify the determinants of the hub premium. Table 3
provides a preliminary look at the type of evidence that we are looking for. We list the airports
at which one airline controls more than 30 percent of the gates, and we show how many of those
airports are hubs, as well as identifying the hub airline. Table 3 also shows how many of these
airports have set limits on the sublease fees that can be charged and the maximum amount of the
limit. For example, at Charlotte, USAir can sublease the gates for which USAir has preferential
or exclusive use, but cannot charge a sublease fee that is more than 15 percent higher than the fee
USAir pays to the airport. At Denver, United can charge any sublease fee, since the airport has
not set a limit. In the empirical analysis, we will quantify the e¤ect that each one of the three
variables OwnGatesjr, Limitr, and MaxLimitr has on the premium that airlines can charge on
ights out of their hubs.
3.5 Control Variables
One crucial issue is whether airlines charge a premium at hubs because they provide a better,
di¤erentiated, product from their competitors, or whether they charge it because they control
access to the airport facilities. We consider ve measures of product di¤erentiation.
The rst measure is related to the network of an airline at an airport and is motivated by the
work of Berry (1990, 1992), Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller (1992), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2006).
We compute the percentage of all markets served out of an airport that are served by one airline and
call this variable PctOriginMarketsjrt. This measure captures the relative attractiveness of the
airlinesfrequent yer programs and other services of the airline at the airport (the number of ticket
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counters, customer service desks, etc).14 Similarly, we dene the variable PctDestMarketsjrt.15
Airlines also di¤erentiate their product by whether they provide non-stop or connecting service.
The variable NonStopjrt is equal to 1 if airline j provides nonstop service on route r at time
t.16 When airlines provide connecting service, they must decide how many miles the passenger
must travel in addition to the nonstop distance between two airports. We construct a variable,
called ExtraMilesjrt, which is equal to the ratio of the own distance over the nonstop distance
in miles between two airports minus one.17 Thus, a nonstop ight will be associated with a value
of ExtraMilesjrt equal to 0, while connecting ights will be associated with values larger than 0.
The larger the number of extra miles that a passenger must travel between two airports, the less
attractive it is to travel on a connecting trip than on a nonstop trip. Airlines also serve markets
with di¤erent ights in a day, or frequency.18 The more ights per day, the more likely a passenger
can y at her preferred time. The variable Frequencyjrt measures the average number of ights per
day in a quarter by an airline.19 Finally, we also includeMarketDis tan cer (the nonstop distance
in miles between two airports) and TouristDestr (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the route has an
endpoint in Florida or California) as additional market-specic controls.
Institutional characteristics of the airline industry ensure that NonStopjrt, ExtraMilesjrt, and
14Bamberger and Carlton (2003) discuss at length why fares should be positively correlated to variables to this
type of hubbing activity at an airport.
15 In a previous version of the paper we also included the number of markets served out of an airport by a carrier.
However, this measure is highly correlated (above 0.95) with the percentage presence as we dened. So we decided
to keep the percentage presence, which is more naturally associated with the idea of frequent yer benets.
16For more details on the construction of the variable NonStop, see the Appendix.
17The own distance varies across itineraries, because an airline may o¤er a number of alternative routings within
an airport-pair. We take a passenger weighted average across itineraries.
18For more details on the construction of the variable Frequency, see the Appendix.
19 In 4 percent of the observations the variable Frequencyjrt is missing, and in those cases it is set to zero and
the related variable MissingFrequencyjrt is set equal to 1; otherwise MissingFrequencyjrt is equal to zero. We
did the analysis with and without Frequencyjrt and the results are similar. We do not report the results for
Mis sinFrequency for sake of brevity.
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Frequencyjrt are determined prior to the airlines choice of prices. This is because prices can
be changed at any time by an airline, while none of these variables can be changed in the same
short period of time. Flight schedules, which involve crew scheduling and aircraft assignments, are
developed a year prior to departure and updated every three months.20 We will maintain that
these ve variables are exogenous in the empirical analysis to follow.
As far as costs are concerned, it is reasonable to think that the economic marginal cost of
transporting one passenger is a function of the average operating accounting cost to carry one
passenger for one mile, a concept known in the airline industry as the average cost per seat mile.
We construct the average cost per seat mile using the ratio of the quarterly operating expenses
available from the Air Carrier Financial Reports (Form 41 Financial Data) over the quarterly total
of the product of the number of seats transported and of the number of miles own by the airline.
Data on the total number of seats and miles own is from the Air Carrier Statistics (Form 41
Tra¢ c). The mean of the average cost per seat mile is approximately 9 cents per seat mile, and
can be as low as 4 cents and as high as 13 cents. Notice that this variable is not market specic.
We multiply this average cost per seat mile by the number of miles own by an airline to provide
service between two airports and call this variable AsmCostjrt.
3.6 Congested Airports
We expect that the control of gates is important when gates are a scarce resource, which is more
likely to occur at congested airports. An important concern is that if an airline leases a large share of
gates at an airport, it may reect the existence of entry barriers but it may also reect the e¢ ciencies
associated with hub operations or the outcome of a dynamic game where airlines di¤erentiate
20For more on this, see Ramdas and Williams (2007), and references therein.
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themselves by developing their services in di¤erent locations. Because we have information on the
total number of gates at an airport, we now show how to infer the importance of gate scarcity as
a barrier to entry.
We propose to study the interaction of the information on gate leases with measures of airport
capacity constraints. In particular, we use our new dataset to dene a measure of congestion, called
CongestedOriginrt, which is equal to the ratio of total departures performed out of an airport in
a given quarter over the the total number of boarding gates. We then divide this ratio by 1000
to simplify the interpretation of the estimation results. Table 2 shows that on average there are
350 departures per gate in a quarter. The minimum is 130 departures, and the maximum is 1007
departures.
To construct the variable CongestedOriginrt we use data from the T100 database to get infor-
mation on the total number of carrier-specic departures that were performed each quarter out of
an airport. We do this by aggregating over carriers and months. Then, we divide this aggregate
measure of departures out of an airport in one quarter by the total number of boarding gates at
each airport. We dene the variable CongestedDestrt similarly. In our analysis we will include
the variables CongestedOriginrt and CongestedDestrt to control for any price di¤erences that is
related to a change in the extent to which an airport is congested.
3.7 Potential Competition of Southwest
Another context where the control of gates is important should be at those airports where Southwest
is not yet present. At these airports, controlling large enough shares of gates may allow the
incumbents to prevent Southwests entry. We construct a variable, called WNatAirportrt, which
is equal to 1 if Southwest is present at both endpoints of a market. We conjecture that the control
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of facilities is less valuable at an airport where Southwest is already present than at an airport
where Southwest is not yet active. For 35 percent of the markets that are included in our sample,
Southwest is present at both the endpoints of the market.
4 Econometric Model
Because we use route-carrier xed e¤ects, each of the specications that we run consists of two
main steps. First we run the specications with route-carrier xed e¤ects, and then we run the
estimated xed e¤ects on the hub and barriers to entry variables, which do not change over time.21
We estimate the following linear specication of the (reduced form) pricing equation, where r
denotes a route and t denotes a time period (year-quarter):
Log(itinfarejrt) =Wjrt + ujr + ujrt: (1)
Here, Wjrt are control variables (see Table 2 for a list of these variables); ujr is a route-carrier
xed e¤ect; and ujrt is an idyiosyncratic error.
To recover estimates of the hub premia and the impact of barriers to entry on equilibrium prices,
we follow Nevos (2001) application of the minimum distance methodology of Chamberlin (1992).
This entails performing a generalized least squares regression of the estimated xed e¤ects, u^jr
on HubUmbrellaOriginr, HubUmbrellaDestr, HubCarrierOriginjr, HubCarrierDestjr, and the
variables that measure limited access to airports, BarriersOriginjr and BarriersDestjr such that
b = (Z 0jrV  1u Zjr) 1Z 0jrV  1u bujr (2)
where Vu is the variance covariance matrix of the estimated xed e¤ects, bujr.
21Berry (1990), BCS (2007), and Brueckner and Spiller (1984) estimate a structural model of demand and supply
to control for product di¤erentiation and economies of density. Here, we take a reduced form approach, given the
focus of our paper on the e¤ect of limited access to airport facilities on equilibrium prices.
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The hub indicators are intended to capture any advantages for hub airlines out of and into their
hubs as well as any of these advantages (or disadvantages) that carry over to their competitors
at these airports. The BarriersOriginr and BarriersDestr vectors are intended to capture the
e¤ect that concentrated rights to gates, MII agreements, slot controls, and limits on subleasing fees
have on pricing decisions of rms at these airports.
In some of our specications we also include the interaction terms of the BarriersOriginm and
BarriersDestm vectors with the variables CongestedOriginrt, CongestedDestrt, andWNatAirportrt.
5 Results
5.1 Unconditional Hub Premium
We start our analysis by estimating the unconditional hub premium. This is a necessary rst
step because the exact magnitude of the correlation between prices and airport dominance is still
debated. Here, we plan to use a constructive approach and show how the hub premium changes as
we introduce variables that measure the degree to which airline products are di¤erentiated as well
as the extent to which access to airport facilities is limited.
Table 4 presents the rst set of results for regression (2). Notice that we do not report the
results from the corresponding rst stage regression (1) since we are not including any variables
that vary over time and carrier. This set of results provide a useful starting point for our analysis
because it illustrates how important it is to control for characteristics that di¤erentiate the products
among airlines.
Column 1 presents the results when the dependent variable is the median itinerary fare. The co-
e¢ cients of the dummy variables HubUmbrellaOriginr and HubUmbrellaDestr measure whether
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all carriers are able to charge a premium in hub markets. The coe¢ cient of the dummy variables
HubCarrierOriginjr and HubCarrierDestjr measure whether the hub carrier charges an extra
premium in hub markets (e.g. by American in markets originating or ending in Dallas/Fort Worth).
The main result is that the premium charged by the hub carrier exists but is not of signicant eco-
nomic magnitude. In particular, it is equal to 6 ( 0:03 + 0:09) percent for tickets out of a hub, as
well as for tickets into a hub. There is no evidence of umbrellae¤ects, since the coe¢ cients for
HubUmbrellaOriginr and HubUmbrellaDestr are negative.
The results in Columns 1-4 of Table 4 suggest that the hub premium is increasing along
the fare distribution. In particular, at the 75th percentile of the distribution (Column 3), the
premium charged by the hub carrier is equal to 10:5 percent.22 At the 90th percentile of the
distribution (Column 4), the premium is equal to 17 percent. Thus, the premium is increasing as
the dependent variable changes from the 25th percentile (Column 2), to the median, to the 90th
percentile of the fare distribution. The di¤erences in the estimated coe¢ cients in Columns 1-4
suggest that the di¤erences among mean and median ticket fares are important. Not surprisingly,
the results are not identical when we use means or medians of the ticket fares. The premia are 11:6
(market out of a hub) and 15 (markets into a hub) percent when we use means.
We reach two main conclusions from Table 4. First, results based on the use of average fares
must be interpreted with care, since the distribution of market fares is not symmetric around the
mean. This is particularly true in hub markets. For this reason, the rest of the analysis will be
carried out using the 25th percentile, the median, the 75th, and the 90th percentile. Second, the
hub premia are increasing in the fare percentile. Notice that this nding is not immediately related
22When discussing the meaning of the coe¢ cients in the tables we use the correction introduced by Halvorsen and
Palmquist [1980]. Our correction takes into account the comment by Kennedy [1981].
19
to the fare-mix story proposed by Morrison and Winston (1995) and Lee and Luengo-Prado
(2005).23 The fare-mixstory says that there is a larger percentage of business travelers ying out
of hubs, and this explains the higher average fares. Here, we nd that the hub premium is higher
for higher fares, but we can not say anything on the fare-mixcomposition.
5.2 Control Variables
We now include additional controls for product di¤erentiation and costs (e.g. economies of density).
The results for the regression (1) are presented in Table 5. This rst stage regression is the same
for Table 6-9.
The results for the control variables should be interpreted with caution, since they represent the
net e¤ect of the variables on the demand and supply. Overall, nonstop ights are associated with
lower prices, which is related to the fact that they imply lower costs. Longer connecting ights,
captured by a higher value of ExtraMiles, are charged at a higher price than shorter ones. A
larger number of markets served by an airline out of an airport is associated with lower prices.
Notice that this is easily explained by the presence of economies of density. Higher frequency is
associated to lower prices, and again this is easily explained with the presence of economies of
density. Finally, the coe¢ cient of the unit cost, AsmCostjrt, is negative, suggesting that the e¤ect
of the average operating cost per seat mile is decreasing as the own distance increases.24
23Morrison and Winston (1995) argue that comparison of fares across markets also requires taking into account
other demand driven control variables, in particular tra¢ c mixand frequent yer tickets. Tra¢ c mix is the fraction
of business passengers ying on a route. Using the Data Bank 1A of the Department of Transportation (DB1A),
Morrison and Winston show that the premia are signicantly lower, approximately 5 percent, after controlling for
tra¢ c mix and frequent yer tickets. We discuss some limitations of the fare mixdata in the DB1A dataset in the
Appendix.
24As mentioned at the top of this paragraph, the results for the control variables should be interpreted with caution
since we are estimating a reduced form model. We interpret the nding that a higher average cost is associated with
lower prices with the fact that a longer own distance relative to the nonstop market distance is likely associated
with lower demand.
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5.3 The Hub Premium
Table 6 presents the results for the regression (2) after we have estimated the rst stage (1) as
discussed in Section (5.2). Notice that we do not include barriers to entry yet.
The main result is that the premium charged by the hub carrier is now of a more signicant
economic magnitude. In particular, it is equal to 11:9 percent for tickets out of a hub, and 12:7
percent for tickets into a hub. There is only limited evidence of umbrella e¤ects, since the
coe¢ cients for HubUmbrellaOriginr and HubUmbrellaDestr are less than or equal to 1 percent.
Again, the results in Columns 2, 3, and 4 suggest that the hub premium is still increasing in
the ticket fare. In particular, at the 75th percentile (Column 3) of the distribution the premium
charged by the hub carrier is equal to 13:5 percent in markets out of a hub and 17:6 percent in
markets into a hub. At the 90th percentile (Column 4) of the distribution, the premium is equal
to 16:8 percent in markets out of a hub and 26 percent in markets into a hub.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between fares and hub premia in an explicit fashion by
plotting the hub premium for each quantile of the fare distribution. To draw the gure we run the
rst stage regression (1) and the second stage one (2) for each one of the ten deciles. As Figure
1 demonstrates, the premium charged by a hub carrier increases by more than 60 percent from the
10th percentile to the 90th percentile of the fare distribution for both markets into and out of hubs.
Figure 1 also shows that the "umbrella" e¤ect is only of any signicance at the very high end of
the fare distribution.
The main conclusion from Table 6 is that the hub premia are larger, once we include variables
that di¤erentiate the products across airlines and that are associated with economies of density.
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5.4 The Hub Premium and Institutional Barriers to Entry
Table 7 shows the results when we add the barriers to entry in the regression (2). The hub
premium is now signicantly smaller. The premium charged by the hub carrier is now equal to
approximately 6 percent, down from 12 percent for tickets out of a hub that we reported in Table
7. We nd that the premium for tickets into a hub is now 9:3 percent, down from 12:7 percent.
The results are stronger when we look at the 75th and 90th percentile of the fare distribution.
Overall, the hub premium is reduced by almost one half if we include the barriers to entry.
One variable, among those measuring the barriers to entry, plays a particularly important role:
the gates leased on an exclusive basis by an airline. We estimate the coe¢ cient of the variable
OwnGatesOriginjr to be equal to 0:163 and the coe¢ cient of the variable OwnGatesDestjr to be
equal to 0:144: This means that if the percentage of gates controlled by the carrier increases from
10 to 30 percent, the prices increase by 3 percent (0:20  0:163).
Next, we consider the variables LimitOriginr and LimitDestr. Recall that these variables
record the presence of restrictions on the fees that airlines can charge for subleasing their gates. As
we would expect, the presence of restrictions on sublease fees decrease the premium that airlines
can charge. For example, the coe¢ cient of LimitOriginr is equal to  0:02 when we look at the
e¤ects on median prices. This means that prices are 2 percent lower when limits on sublease fees
are in place. Notice that the e¤ect is equal to  6:2 percent when we consider the 90th percentile.
The coe¢ cients of the other variables are estimated with considerable noise. The presence
of limits on sublease fees is associated with an actual percentage limit. We do not nd strong
and consistent results for the variables MaxLimitOriginr and MaxLimitDestr, which suggests
that the actual percentage limit (15 or 25 percent) is not as important as the presence of a limit.
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Airports that have Majority-in-Interest agreements seem to have lower fares at the bottom of the
fare distribution, but not at the 75th and 90th percentile.
Finally, the coe¢ cients of the number of gates also vary along the fare distribution, as we nd
them to be negative at the bottom and positive at the top. This suggests that control of gates
might be particularly important to serve business travelers, possibly because a larger fraction of
gates is associated with more exible departure times.
Overall, Table 7 shows that access to gates is a crucial determinant of the hub premium in the
airline industry. First, the higher the percentage of gates controlled at an airport, the higher the
prices that airlines are able to charge. Second, the presence of a limit on sublease fees seems to
play an important role in reducing the hub premium. There is only mixed evidence for the other
institutional barriers to entry.
5.5 The Hub Premium at Congested Airports
We now consider how the results change when we control for the level of congestion at an air-
port. In practice, we add a set of interaction terms between the variable CongestedOriginrt
(CongestedDestrt) and the variables that measure the availability of gates at airports. For exam-
ple, we consider the interaction LimitOriginrt  CongestedOriginrt. The results are presented in
Table 8.
First, we nd that the hub premium is now smaller than in Table 7. The premium charged by
the hub carrier for ights out of the hub is now less than 4 percent, down from 6 percent in Table
7 and 12 percent in Table 6. The hub premium in markets into a hub is now 7:2 percent, down
from 12:7 percent in Table 6. Again, the results are stronger when we look at the 75th and 90th
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percentile.
Next, we consider the interaction terms. We start with the interactions OwnGatesOriginrt 
CongestedOriginrt and OwnGatesDestrt CongestedDestrt. We nd their coe¢ cients to be posi-
tive and precisely estimated. In particular, the coe¢ cient ofOwnGatesOriginrtCongestedOriginrt
is equal to 0:325. Recall that CongestedOriginrt is dened as the ratio of departures out of an
airport over the number of gates at that airport, and that we divide it by 1000. So, a nding of
0:325 means that at an airport where there are around 600 departures per gate (e.g. Atlanta), a 30
percent di¤erence in the gates leased would lead to a di¤erence of 6 percent (0:30  0:325  0:6) in
the airline prices. At an airport where there were around 200 departures per gate (e.g. Nashville),
a 30 percent di¤erence would lead to a di¤erence of 2 percent. Now consider the coe¢ cients of
OwnGatesOriginrt and OwnGatesDestrt. The results are striking. Controlling a large fraction
of gates at airports that are not congested does not lead to higher prices. Hence, the control of
gates is a crucial determinant of airline prices and hub premia only when there is a scarcity of gates
relative to the number of departures out or into an airport. Interestingly, there does not seem to
be a stronger e¤ect at the higher end of the fare distribution, as we nd the coe¢ cients of the
interaction terms to be essentially the same in the four columns.
Now consider the interactions LimitOriginrtCongestedOriginrt and LimitDestrtCongestedDestrt.
Both coe¢ cients are negative and precisely estimated, and should be interpreted as follows. At an
airport where there are around 600 departures per gate, the presence of a limit on the sublease fees
lowers the premium by approximately 11 percent (( 0:340 + 0:158)  0:600). Notice that at the
airports with the smallest value of CongestedOriginrt, where it is equal to approximately 120, the
presence of a limit would lower the premium by just 2 percent.
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The interactionsMaxLimitOriginrCongestedOriginrt andMaxLimitDestrCongestedDestrt
are positive as expected. At congested airports, an increase in the limits to the sublease fee trans-
lates in higher prices. Again, to compute the magnitude of the e¤ect, we need to take the sum
of MaxLimitOriginr CongestedOriginrt and MaxLimitOriginr at a given value of the variable
CongestedOriginrt. Notice that this variable never takes a value less than 130, so the sum is never
negative.
Finally, the interactions ofMIIOriginrtCongestedOriginrt andMIIDestrtCongestedDestrt
are also positive, as expected. More importantly, the sum of MIIOriginrt and MIIOriginrt 
CongestedOriginrt is also positive (and similarly for the corresponding destination variables).
Thus, airports that are more congested are more likely to see higher prices when they share the
rights to decide on expansion projects with the airline controlling the majority of their operations.
Overall, these results provide strong evidence that airlines controlling a larger number of gates
benet signicantly more at congested airports than at airports where gates are not a scarce
resource.
5.6 The Hub Premium at Airports where Southwest is Present
We now look at the extent to which the control of gates is important at airports where Southwest is
present. The idea of this section is quite simple. If Southwest is present at an airport, then it is also
present in some of the routes out of that airport. Hence, the prices out of that particular airport
should be, ceteris paribus, lower than at airports where Southwest is not yet present. In particular,
we are interested in the sign and magnitude of the interaction of the variable WNatAirportrt with
the variables that measure the access to the airports facilities. The results are presented in Table
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9.
First, consider the coe¢ cients of OwnGatesOriginrt and OwnGatesDestrt. They are positive
and slightly larger than in Table 7. Recall that this means that the control of a larger share of
airport gates is associated with higher prices. Now, consider the interactions WNatAirportrt 
OwnGatesOriginrt and WNatAirportrt OwnGatesDestrt. We nd that these interactions have
a negative e¤ect on prices. This means the following. In markets between two airports where
Southwest is present (WNatAirportrt = 1) controlling 10 percent more of the gates would increase
the prices by a negligible amount (0:25 percent at the origin). These results suggest that control
of gates is an important determinant of higher airline prices only where Southwest is not already
present at the airport.
Interestingly, the presence of Southwest has a policinge¤ect only with regard to the control of
gates. The e¤ect of the other variables measuring access to airport facilities (Limit, MaxLimit;
MII) are essentially unchanged.
5.7 Airport Dominanceand Limited Access to Airport Facilities
Finally, we check the robustness of our results when we include in the rst stage regression (1) the
measure of airport dominanceused by Borenstein (1989). For each market, we dene a measure of
airport dominance for the origin and destination as DominanceOriginjrt and DominanceDestjrt,
respectively. Similar to Borenstein (1989), these variables are constructed as the sum of passengers
transported out (or into) an airport by a carrier over the total number of passengers traveling out
(or into) an airport in a quarter. A subtle point is worth being made here. Because the number
of passengers transported is a function of the fare charged by the carrier, the rst stage regression
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(1) is no longer a reduced form regression. However, we believe that this approach still provides a
useful robustness check for our ndings.
We also dene two additional variables.MeanDomin anceOriginjr andMeanDomin anceDestjrt.
These are route-carrier specic averages of DominanceOriginjrt and DominanceDestjrt, respec-
tively. These averages are not used in the rst stage, but are used in the second stage, to pick up
any e¤ect of airport dominancepresence that can be measured cross-sectionally.
The results from these regressions are presented in Table 10.25 By comparing the respective
columns of Table 7 and Table 10, it is clear that the addition of these controls have a negligble
e¤ect on our estimates of the hub premium and the impact of the barriers to entry. This is true for
each quantile of the fare distribution that we consider. Notice that the coe¢ cients of the variables
MeanDomin anceOriginjr and MeanDomin anceDestjrt have the expected positive sign.
Thus, these additional and potentially endogenous controls that are commonly used in the
literature do not change our results or our conclusions made above regarding the magnitude of the
hub premium. In addition, the impact of the respective barriers to entry are nearly identical with or
without these measures of airport dominance. We still consistently nd that concentrated control
of boarding gates results in signicantly higher fares. Again, the impact of the size of the limit on
subleasing fees (MaxLimitOriginr and MaxLimitDestr) and the presence of Majority-in-Interest
(MiiOriginr and MiiDestr) agreements are estimated imprecisely and no denitive conclusions
should be drawn from the results.
25We do not report the results from the rst stage regression for sake of brevity. They are available from the
authors.
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6 Conclusions
Following deregulation of the US airline industry in 1978, there was a great deal of optimism
that airline markets would become more competitive and fares would decline substantially. The
theoretical framework justifying this optimism was the theory of contestable marketsdeveloped
by Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1992). Their basic insight was that airlines do not incur large sunk
costs to enter into markets, and thus they can easily enter when prices are high and exit as soon
as prices fall too much.
In this paper we show that airlines can still charge a large premium in markets into and out of
their hubs. In particular, we nd that the hub premium is inuenced by gate ownership, particularly
when gate utilization is high at an airport, and the the hub premium is larger at the high end of the
fare distribution. Future research should focus on the role that barriers to entry have on the entry
decisions, as that is also an important determinant of long run competition in airline markets.26
Finally, we want to highlight that our research can explain approximately 50 percent of the hub
premium. The other 50 percent is still to be explained. It could be a function of what Borenstein
(1989) calls marketing barriers to entry: frequent-yer programs (FFPs) and volume incentives to
travel agents that might allow airlines to raise their prices above their marginal cost. Unfortunately,
data on FFPs are not available. The remainder of the premium may also be explained as a function
of the strategic behavior of airlines.27
26Williams (2008) nds that that improved access to boarding gates at hub airports is the most signicant deter-
minant of the sunk cost of entry, particularly for LCCs.
27For example, Miller (2009) studies the US Department of Justices suit against eight major domestic airlines
and the Airline Tari¤ Publishing Company. The purpose of the suit was to reduce opportunities for collusion in
the industry. The lawsuit ended with consent decrees limiting the ability of airlines to communicate surreptitiously
through the shared fare database. Direct data on these practices remains unavailable.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data Construction: Fare and Passenger Data
Fare and passenger information are from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is a 10
percent sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. The data from the DB1B are merged with
data from the T-100 Domestic Segment Dataset by the operating carrier. The T-100 Domestic
Segment Dataset contains domestic market data by air carriers, origin and destination airports for
passengers enplaned. The T-100 is not a sample: it reports all ights occurred in the United States
in a given month of the year. Data are from every quarter from the rst quarter in 1993 to the third
quarter in 2005. A market is dened as a unidirectional trip from one airport to another airport,
with or without connections. The unit of observation is a market-carrier-year-quarter data point.
We drop: tickets that are neither one-way nor round-trip travel, such as open-jaw trip tickets;
tickets involving a US-nonreporting carrier ying within North America and foreign carrier ying
between two US points; tickets that are part of international travel; tickets including travel on more
than one airline on a directional trip (known as interline tickets); tickets involving non-contiguous
domestic travel (Hawaii, Alaska, and Territories); tickets with fares less than 20 dollars or larger
than 9999 dollars; and tickets whose fares were in the bottom and top 5 percentile percentile in
their year; tickets with more than 6 coupons. We then merge this dataset with the T-100 Domestic
Segment (U.S. Carriers) and drop tickets for ights that have less than 12 departures over a quarter
in one direction (this means less than 1 departure every week in one direction).
We code a round-trip ticket as one directional trip ticket, which costs half the full round-trip
ticket fare. This avoids overcounting the lower fares associated with round-trip tickets relative
to the higher fares associated with purchasing two one-way tickets. In this way, it is possible to
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make the comparisons between one-way and round-trip fares meaningful, by comparing what two
passengers would pay for traveling the same distance. Each passenger is only counted once when
constructing the market and airport market shares.28
We construct the NonStop variable using the following procedure. For each ticket we know
the number of segments own by the passenger. If the passenger used one coupon for one-way
travel and the airline provided nonstop service on that route, then we code this ticket as a non-stop
ticket. If the passenger used two coupons for a round-trip ticket and the airline provided nonstop
service on the two routes, then we code this ticket as a non-stop ticket. Otherwise, the ticket is for
a connecting or direct (connecting but using only one coupon) ight. In principle, an airline can
provide both non-stop and connecting service between two airports. It turns out that in our sample
in 63 percent of the observations (year-quarter-route-carrier), a carrier only provided connecting
service. Among the remaining 37 percent of the observations, a carrier might provide both non-stop
and connecting service. However, it turns out that carriers sell a non-negligible number (at least 30
percent of the tickets on a route in a quarter) of connecting tickets when they also provide nonstop
service in less than 2 percent of the observations. Because the price variable is constructed as a
median, the median price is the price of the nonstop service in all but a very negligible number
of markets. Thus, we coded NonStop = 1 if the carrier provided nonstop service between two
airports.
We construct the Frequency variable using the following procedure. If an airline provide non-
stop service on a route, then Frequency is simply the number of departures in a quarter divided
by 91, and this provide the average number of ights per day. If an airline provides connecting
28To check that this coding did not a¤ect the result, we re-run our regressions considering only data from roundtrip
tickets. The results were almost identical.
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service on a route, then the variable Frequency is equal to the minimum number of daily ights
among those in each segment that the airline ew on the route. This is the same approach as in
Borenstein (1989). In some cases, airlines issue a coupon for two segments of ight. Then, data
on frequency is missing. When this happens, we let the variable MissingFrequency be equal to 1.
Following Borenstein (1989), the mean, median, 25th percentile, and 75 percentile fares are
from the distribution of fares weighted by the number of passengers paying each fare, not from
a distribution that gives equal weight to each fare listed by the airline. We do not use data on
fare class from Data Bank 1B because of the following reasons. First, in private communication
with the National Transportation Library in the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, it came to our
attention that it is possible that one airline may classify a ticket as falling into class X while another
airline may classify the same ticket as falling into class Y. The reason for this is that there are no
rules as to the standardization of what X and Y means. Second, Southwest codes all tickets under
one fare class, despite selling tickets with di¤erent fare restrictions. As a result, it is questionable
whether or not the information on fare classes contained in the US Department of Transportation
O&D Survey can be used to build a reliable tra¢ c mix variable. Finally, the number of frequent
yer tickets (and tra¢ c mix) are endogenous, in the sense that prices, the number of frequent yer
tickets, and the fare mix are determined simultaneously.
One important issue is how to treat regional airlines that operate through code-sharing agree-
ments with national airlines. As long as the regional airline sells tickets independently, we treat
it separately from the national airline.29 Another issue is that there are airlines that transport
29The D1B1 dataset provides information on the operating and ticketing carrier, which might di¤er in the
case of code share agreements. In their institutional analysis of airline alliances, Bamberger, Carlton, and Neumann
[forthcoming] discuss how code-share agreements allow a carrier to independently set price and sell service between
cities that it otherwise would not be able to serve. Code share agreements can involve di¤erent nancial agreements
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very few passengers in a quarter. In particular, consider an airline using a small plane that has 20
seats to serve a regional market. One ight per week over a quarter tells us that the airline will
transport 240 passengers at full capacity. A 10 percent sample should give the airline reporting
24 passengers in the dataset. If an airline reports less than 20 passengers in a quarter, we assume
that the airline does not have an active presence in this market. Berry (1992) drops airlines which
report less than 90 passengers in a quarter. We relax this condition to account for the progressive
adoption of smaller regional jets by the US airlines.
7.2 Data Construction: AIR 21 Data
The data from the competition plans is a cross-section. Airports included: Albuquerque (ABQ), At-
lanta (ATL),Austin (AUS), Baltimore (BWI), Burbank (BUR), Charlotte (CLT), Chicago OHare
(ORD), Cincinnati (CVG), Dallas Fort-Worth (DFW), Denver (DEN), Detroit (DTW), Hous-
ton (IAH), Washington Dulles (IAD), Washington Reagan (DCA), Tucson (TUS), Miami (MIA),
Milwaukee (MKE), Minneapolis (MSP), Newark (EWR), Philadelphia (PHL), Phoenix (PHX),
Pittsburgh (PIT), St. Louis (STL), Salt Lake City (SLC), San Francisco (SFO), Chicago Midway
(MDW), Cleveland (CLE), Dallas Love (DAL), El Paso (ELP), Houston Hobby (HOU), Jack-
sonville (JAX), Memphis (MEM), Nashville (BNA), Oakland (OAK), Providence (PVD), Reno
(RNO), Sacramento (SMF), San Antonio (SAT), San Jose(SJC), West Palm Beach (PBI).
We merge it with the fare and passenger data, which is a panel data set. During this process of
merging the two data set, we need to clean the AIR 21 data set as follows. At JAX, American uses
between the operating carrier and its alliance partner. In some alliances (free saleagreement), the operating carrier
determines seat availability and the ticketing carrier sets prices for its service. In other alliances (blocked space
agreement), the ticketing carrier buys a block of seats on each code-share ight from the operating carrier. Since
fares are set by the ticketing carrier in both cases, we use the ticketing carrier to assign a ticket to a specic airline.
Notice that this approach addresses the issue of how to treat regional carriers that operate for major airlines.
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a gate that is for common use. We code that gate as for common use rather than as of American.
The same is true for Southwest, who also uses a common-use gate. At SMF, the gates of AA include
the activity of TWA. The gates of CO include the activity of HP. We have three competition plans
for SMF. The number of gates and assignment change very little. Instead, the limit on sublease
fees changed from not existing in 2000 to being 15% in 2001. At ATL, Atlantic Southwest Airlines
is counted as Delta. At SLC, Skywest controls the gates and serves DL: we coded these gates as
controlled by DL. At IAD, Atlantic Coast Airlines gates assigned to UA. At SLC, it says that
an entrant was charged above 15% and airport helped negotiation but does not tell how lower the
fee was charged. It says they are introducing a limit, but with new agreement. At PHL they
were constructing 13 gates, which are included. We do no include 4 gates and 38 regional gates
expected to be added after the period of interest. At DTW, 5 gates are assigned to both HP and
CO, but we used the number of departures to split 4 to Continental and 1 to America West. At
DAL, 25 gates were available but only 18 operational. At CLE, USair sublets one gate to Midwest;
Continental sublets one to America West; also, Continental has 4 gates that can serve 6 regional
planes each. We coded them as counting for 4. At BUR, airlines cannot sublease gates. There are
three overow gates which we interpret as common use. At MIA, all gates are for common use, no
subleasing necessary. At DFW, 37 are non-bridge positions. We do not count them. The TWA
gates went to AA when TWA was acquired by AA. MKE converted one gate of TWA to common
use. AA serves the airport through AA Eagle since 1996. Data for ORD, MDW, OAK, BWI
was collected from the airport websites, their competition plans, direct contact with the airports,
and from the publication Airport Business Practices and their Impact on Airline Competition,
published by the FAA/OST Task Force Study in October 1999.
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
OwnGates (%) Fraction of Gates Leased on an Exclusive or Preferential
Basis to an Airline 0.14 0.20 0 0.79
Limit (0/1) There is a Limit on Sublease Fees
0.50 0.50 0 1
MaxLimit (%) Magnitude of the Maximum Sublease Fee Conditional on
the Presence of a Limit on Sublease Fees 0.15 0.06 0 0.25
MII Majority in Interest Agreement
0.69 0.46 0 1
Number Gates (00) Number of Gates Available at an Airport
0.75 0.44 0 1.72
NOTE.-The “Fraction of Gates Leased” to an airline is computed as the ratio of the gates leased with exclusive or preferential use to an
airline over the total number of gates at an airport. Summary statistics use the origin airport: the variables at the destination airports are
the same as those for origin airports up to second decimal digit.  Number of observations is 42,269.
SOURCE.-  Data collected from the airports’ competition plans that airports must compile in compliance to the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21).
Table 1:  Limited Access to Airport Facilities
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ticket Fares
Median Ticket Fare ($100) Median of the fares charged by an airlines in aquarter in each market 1.22 0.33 0.44 2.36
25th Percentile Ticket Fare ($100) 25
th Percentile of the fares charged by an airlines
in a quarter in each market
0.97 0.23 0.42 2.16
75th Percentile Ticket Fare ($100) 75
th Percentile of the fares charged by an airlines
in a quarter in each
1.67 0.52 0.44 5.25
90th Percentile Ticket Fare ($100) 90
th Percentile of the fares charged by an airlines
in a quarter in each
2.24 0.52 0.44 7.35
Average Ticket Fare ($100) Average of the fares charged by an airlines in aquarter in each market 1.41 0.34 0.45 3.35
Hub Dummies
HubOrigin (0/1) Equal to 1 if origin airport is a hub of any of thenational carriers 0.42 0.49 0 1
HubCarrier (0/1)
Equal to 1 whenever the observation is for a
carrier in a market out of an airport where
carrier is hub airline
0.13 0.34 0 1
Congestion Measures
Congested (00)
Ratio of total departures performed out of an
airport in a given quarter over the total number
of boarding gates.
0.50 0.16 0.13 1.07
CongestedDummy (0/1) Equal to 1 if the variable Congested is largerthan its 75th percentile value (550) 0.34 0.47 0 1
WN is a Potential Entrant
PotentialWN (0/1) Equal to 1 if Southwest is present at both the
endpoints of a market. 0.35 0.48 0 1
Firm Specific Variables
PctOriginMarkets (%)
Network Extent at the Airport: Percentage  of
markets served out of an airport by one airline
out of the total number of markets served out of
that airport by any airline
0.44 0.23 0.01 1
Nonstop (0/1) Dummy Equal to 1 for Tickets for NonstopFlight 0.37 0.48 0 1
Frequency (00s) Average Daily Frequency 0.04 0.02 0 0.28
Missing Frequency (%) If data on Frequency is missing 0.05 0.14 0 0.28
ExtraMiles Ratio of Distance Flown by an Airline overNonStop Distance 0.09 0.14 0 1.60
Accounting Cost Average Cost per Seat Mile (ASM Cost, cents) *Flown Miles (00s) 0.87 0.81 0 4.06
Market Specific Variables
Tourist Destination (0/1) Equal to 1 if destination airport is in eitherCalifornia, Florida, or Nevada 0.22 0.41 0 1
Market Distance (1000 miles) Non Stop Distance 1.21 0.59 0.10 2.68
Table 2: Summary Statistics
SOURCE.-Data collected from DB1B Origin and Destination Survey (2002-2004)
NOTE.-Summary statistics use the origin airport: the variables at the destination airports are the same as those for originthey are not
airports up to second decimal digit, hence reported for sake of brevity. The fares presented and the cost data are in 1993 dollars.  Details
on the construction of the variables Non-Stop and Frequency are provided in the Appendix.  Number of observations is 42,269.
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Airport, Carrier HubCarrier (0/1) OwnGates (%) Limit (0/1) MaxLimit (%)
St. Louis, American 1 0.22 1 0.15
Washington Reagan, USAir 0 0.32 0 .
Chicago O’Hare, American 1 0.35 0 .
Chicago O’Hare, United 1 0.35 0 .
San Jose, American 0 0.36 0 .
Cincinnati, Delta 1 0.42 0 .
Charlotte, USAir 1 0.43 1 0.15
Atlanta, Delta 1 0.55 1 0
Philadelphia, USAir 1 0.50 0 .
Phoenix, America West 1 0.40 1 0.15
Baltimore, USAir 0 0.52 0 .
Newark, Continental 1 0.58 0 .
Denver, United 1 0.60 0 .
Cleveland, Continental 1 0.60 1 0.1
Detroit, Northwest 1 0.68 1 0.15
Dallas/Fort Worth, American 1 0.64 0 .
Salt Lake City, Delta 0 0.67 0 .
Minneapolis, Northwest 1 0.72 1 0.15
Houston (IAH), Continental 1 0.75 0 .
Table 3:  Control of Gates at Hubs and other Large Airports
SOURCE.-Data collected from the airports’ competition plans that airports must compile in compliance to the Wendell H.
Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21).
NOTE.-  The airports included in this table are either the hubs of a legacy carrier or airports where one carrier controls
more than 30 percent of the gates. OwnGates indicates the percentage of gates leased to the airline with the largest share at
an airport (e.g. American at St. Louis). Limit is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the airport has a limit on sublease fees. If
the airport has a limit, then MaxLimit reports its magnitude.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
50th% Fare 25th% Fare 75th% Fare 90th% Fare Mean Fare
Hub Dummies
HubUmbrellaOrigin -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
HubUmbrellaDest -0.02*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
HubCarrierOrigin 0.09*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.14*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01)
HubCarrierDest 0.08*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.14*** (0.01) 0.21*** (0.01) 0.14*** (0.01)
Controls
Tourist -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) -0.08*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01)
Distance 0.15*** (0.01) 0.18*** (0.00) 0.13*** (0.01) 0.17*** (0.01) 0.16*** (0.00)
Constant 4.60*** (0.01) 4.34*** (0.01) 4.89*** (0.01) 5.09*** (0.01) 4.71*** (0.01)
R-Squared 0.15 0.26 0.12 0.17 0.2
# Observations 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269
*    p<0.10
**   p<0.05
***  p<0.01
Table 4:  Unconditional Hub Premia
41
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
50th% Fare 25th% Fare 75th% Fare 90th% Fare Mean Fare
NonStop -0.37*** (0.07) -0.43*** (0.05) -0.28*** (0.06) -0.31*** (0.08) -0.44*** (0.05)
ExtraMiles 0.24*** (0.03) 0.23*** (0.03) 0.18*** (0.03) 0.14*** (0.04) 0.18*** (0.02)
PctOriginMarkets -0.16*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.21*** (0.02) -0.20*** (0.03) -0.18*** (0.02)
PctDestMarkets -0.17*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.21*** (0.02) -0.19*** (0.03) -0.17*** (0.02)
Frequency -0.76*** (0.15) -0.56*** (0.11) -0.76*** (0.13) -0.94*** (0.16) -0.91*** (0.11)
AsmCost -0.05*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.664  0.693 0.673 0.683 0.745
# Observations 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269
*    p<0.10
**   p<0.05
***  p<0.01
Table 5:  First Stage Regressions
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
50th% Fare 25th% Fare 75th% Fare 90th% Fare Mean Fare
Hub Dummies
HubUmbrellaOrigin 0.00 (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01)
HubUmbrellaDest 0.01 (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
HubCarrierOrigin 0.11*** (0.02) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.01)
HubCarrierDest 0.11*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.12*** (0.01) 0.15*** (0.02) 0.13*** (0.01)
Controls
Tourist -0.06*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01)
Distance 0.16*** (0.01) 0.17*** (0.01) 0.09*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01)
Constant 4.75*** (0.04) 4.44*** (0.03) 4.72*** (0.04) 4.24*** (0.05) 4.37*** (0.03)
R-Squared 0.15 0.26 0.16 0.29 0.30
# Observations 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269
*    p<0.10
**   p<0.05
***  p<0.01
Table 6:  Hub Premia
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
50th% Fare 25th% Fare 75th% Fare 90th% Fare
Hub Dummies
HubUmbrellaOrigin 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01)
HubUmbrellaDest 0.02*** (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01)
HubCarrierOrigin 0.06*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02)
HubCarrierDest 0.07*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02)
Barriers
OwnGatesOrigin 0.16*** (0.02) 0.16*** (0.02) 0.15*** (0.03) 0.19*** (0.03)
OwnGatesDest 0.14*** (0.03) 0.14*** (0.02) 0.15*** (0.03) 0.27*** (0.03)
LimitOrigin -0.02* (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) -0.03** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01)
MaxLimitOrigin -0.04 (0.08) -0.06 (0.06) 0.01 (0.09) 0.19** (0.09)
LimitDest -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.05*** (0.02)
MaxLimitDest -0.07 (0.08) -0.11* (0.07) -0.08 (0.09) 0.09 (0.10)
MiiOrigin -0.03*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
MiiDest -0.01* (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01** (0.01)
NumberGatesOrigin 0.01 (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01)
NumberGatesDest -0.01 (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
R-Squared 0.20 0.29 0.18 0.32
# Observations 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269
NOTE.-  Controls for market distance as well as tourist market dummies are included in each regression.
*    p<0.10
**   p<0.05
***  p<0.01
Table 7:  Hub Premia with Gates
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
50th% Fare 25th% Fare 75th% Fare 90th% Fare
Hub Dummies
HubUmbrellaOrigin 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) ** 0.04 (0.01) ***
HubUmbrellaDest 0.03 (0.01) *** 0.01 (0.01) ** 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.06 (0.01) ***
HubCarrierOrigin 0.04 (0.02) *** 0.06 (0.01) *** 0.03 (0.02) * 0.02 (0.02)
HubCarrierDest 0.05 (0.02) *** 0.05 (0.01) *** 0.06 (0.02) *** 0.06 (0.06) ***
Barriers
CongestedOrigin*NumberGatesOrigin 0.33 (0.10) *** 0.20 (0.08) *** 0.41 (0.12) *** 0.29 (0.12) ***
CongestedDest*NumberGatesDest 0.26 (0.11) *** 0.25 (0.09) *** 0.20 (0.13) * 0.02 (0.13)
OwnGatesOrigin 0.01 (0.05) 0.07 (0.04) ** -0.04 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06)
OwnGatesDest 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05) 0.07 (0.07) 0.26 (0.07) ***
CongestedOrigin*LimitOrigin -0.34 (0.09) *** -0.21 (0.08) *** -0.38 (0.11) *** -0.48 (0.11) ***
CongestedDest*LimitDest -0.26 (0.09) *** -0.10 (0.07)* -0.38 (0.11) *** -0.62 (0.11) ***
LimitOrigin 0.16 (0.05) *** 0.09 (0.04) ** 0.17 (0.06) *** 0.19 (0.06) ***
LimitDest 0.12 (0.05) *** 0.04 (0.04) 0.19 (0.06) *** 0.28 (0.06) ***
CongestedOrigin*MaxLimitOrigin 1.73 (0.48) *** 1.12 (0.41)*** 2.07 (0.58) *** 2.75 (0.59) ***
CongestedDest*MaxLimitDest 1.76 (0.46) *** 0.77 (0.39) ** 2.44 (0.55) *** 3.68 (0.57) ***
MaxLimitOrigin -0.88 (0.26) *** -0.54 (0.22) *** -1.00 (0.32) *** -1.13 (0.33) ***
MaxLimitDest -0.88 (0.25) *** -0.37 (0.21) ** -1.28 (0.30) *** -1.76 (0.31) ***
CongestedOrigin*MiiOrigin 0.21 (0.05) *** 0.26 (0.04) *** 0.21 (0.06) *** 0.35 (0.06) ***
CongestedDest*MiiDest 0.26 (0.05) *** 0.28 (0.04) *** 0.16 (0.06) *** 0.22 (0.06) ***
MiiOrigin -0.12 (0.02) *** -0.16 (0.02) *** -0.11 (0.03) *** -0.16 (0.03) ***
MiiDest -0.12 (0.02) *** -0.15 (0.02) *** -0.06 (0.03) ** -0.08 (0.03) ***
CongestedOrigin -0.17 (0.05) *** -0.20 (0.04) *** -0.19 (0.06)*** -0.30 (0.06) ***
CongestedDest -0.25 (0.05) *** -0.26 (0.04) *** -0.12 (0.06) ** -0.16 (0.06) ***
NumberGatesOrigin 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) * 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.06 (0.01) ***
NumberGatesDest -0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) *** 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) ***
R-Squared 0.21 0.34 0.19 0.33
# Observations 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269
NOTE.-  Controls for market distance as well as tourist market dummies are included in each regression.
*    p<0.10
**   p<0.05
***  p<0.01
Table 8:  Hub Premia with Gates and Congestion
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
50th% Fare 25th% Fare 75th% Fare 90th% Fare
Hub Dummies
HubUmbrellaOrigin 0.01 (0.01) * 0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) *** 0.04 (0.01) ***
HubUmbrellaDest 0.03 (0.01) *** 0.01 (0.01) ** 0.06 (0.01) *** 0.07 (0.01) ***
HubCarrierOrigin 0.07 (0.01) *** 0.08 (0.01) *** 0.07 (0.02) *** 0.06 (0.02) ***
HubCarrierDest 0.07 (0.01) *** 0.08 (0.01) *** 0.08 (0.02) *** 0.08 (0.02) ***
Barriers
OwnGatesOrigin*WNatBothAirports -0.16 (0.03) *** -0.11 (0.03)*** -0.24 (0.04) *** -0.15 (0.04) ***
OwnGatesDest*WNatBothAirports -0.14 (0.03) *** -0.09 (0.03) *** -0.24 (0.04) *** -0.20 (0.04) ***
OwnGatesOrigin 0.18 (0.03) *** 0.17 (0.02) *** 0.19 (0.03) *** 0.21 (0.03) ***
OwnGatesDest 0.16 (0.03) *** 0.14 (0.02) *** 0.20 (0.03) *** 0.29 (0.03) ***
LimitOrigin*WNatBothAirports -0.03 (0.03) * -0.03 (0.02) * -0.06 (0.03) ** -0.03 (0.03)
LimitDest*WNatBothAirports -0.03 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.03) ** -0.03 (0.03)
LimitOrigin 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) **
LimitDest 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) *
MaxLimitOrigin*WNatBothAirports 0.05 (0.15) 0.03 (0.12) 0.19 (0.18) 0.05 (0.18)
MaxLimitDest*WNatBothAirports -0.06 (0.14) -0.01 (0.12) 0.10 (0.18) 0.01 (0.18)
MaxLimitOrigin -0.06 (0.09) -0.07 (0.08) -0.06 (0.12) 0.17 (0.12) *
MaxLimitDest -0.01 (0.09) -0.06 (0.08) -0.07 (0.12) 0.13 (0.12)
MiiOrigin*WNatBothAirports 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) ** -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
MiiDest*WNatBothAirports 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) ** -0.02 (0.02) * -0.02 (0.02)
MiiOrigin -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.06 (0.01) *** -0.03 (0.01) *** -0.03 (0.01) ***
MiiDest -0.03 (0.01) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
WNatBothAirports -0.07 (0.02) *** -0.10 (0.02) *** -0.02 (0.02) -0.10 (0.02) ***
NumberGatesOrigin -0.03 (0.01) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
NumberGatesDest -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.06 (0.01) *** -0.04 (0.01) *** -0.03 (0.01) **
R-Squared 0.25 0.35 0.23 0.37
# Observations 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269
NOTE.-  Controls for market distance as well as tourist market dummies are included in each regression.
*    p<0.10
**   p<0.05
***  p<0.01
Table 9:  Hub Premia with Gates and WN Potential Competition
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
50th% Fare 25th% Fare 75th% Fare 90th% Fare
Hub Dummies
HubUmbrellaOrigin 0.01  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.03***  (0.01) 0.04***  (0.01)
HubUmbrellaDest 0.03***  (0.01) 0.01*  (0.01) 0.06***  (0.01) 0.07***  (0.01)
HubCarrierOrigin 0.05***  (0.02) 0.06***  (0.01) 0.04**  (0.02) 0.04**  (0.02)
HubCarrierDest 0.05***  (0.02) 0.06***  (0.01) 0.05***  (0.02) 0.06***  (0.02)
Barriers
OwnGatesOrigin 0.17***  (0.03) 0.16***  (0.02) 0.15***  (0.03) 0.19***  (0.03)
OwnGatesDest 0.15***  (0.03) 0.15***  (0.02) 0.17***  (0.03) 0.27***  (0.03)
NumberGatesOrigin 0.01  (0.01) -0.01*  (0.01) 0.04***  (0.01) 0.06***  (0.01)
NumberGatesDest -0.01  (0.01) -0.02***  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.02  (0.01)
MiiOrigin -0.02***  (0.01) -0.04***  (0.01) -0.01  (0.01) -0.01  (0.01)
MiiDest -0.01  (0.01) -0.02***  (0.01) 0.01  (0.01) 0.01*  (0.01)
LimitOrigin -0.02*  (0.01) -0.02  (0.01) -0.03***  (0.01) -0.06***  (0.01)
MaxLimitOrigin -0.03  (0.07) -0.06  (0.06) 0.03  (0.09) 0.19**  (0.09)
LimitDest -0.01  (0.01) -0.01  (0.01) -0.02  (0.01) -0.05***  (0.01)
MaxLimitDest -0.05  (0.08) -0.10  (0.07) -0.05  (0.09) 0.09  (0.10)
AirportPresenceOrigin 0.22*  (0.13) 0.15  (0.11) 0.25  (0.16) 0.25  (0.16)
AirportPresenceDest 0.36***  (0.14) 0.21*  (0.12) 0.33**  (0.16) 0.07  (0.17)
R-Squared 0.21 0.29 0.18 0.31
# Observations 42,269 42,269 42,269 42,269
NOTE.-  Controls for market distance as well as tourist market dummies are included in each regression.
*    p<0.10
**   p<0.05
***  p<0.01
Table 10:  Hub Premia with Airport Share
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